Negotiations, not Unilateral Declarations
It is a truth that should be universally acknowledged that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians can be resolved only by negotiations between the parties, not through unilateral declarations by one side. A unilateral declaration as proposed by the Palestinian Authority to the United Nations in September 2011 would mean renouncing the many attempts made in many forums over the last 60 years to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict by a negotiating process to which the Palestinians have agreed on many occasions. It would constitute a breach by the Palestinians of their past agreements and legal obligations. It would avoid recognizing the state of Israel and would avoid ending the conflict. It would be an act of bad faith.
Reviewing the historical narrative illuminates the present reality and shows that the only way to resolve the conflict is through negotiation between the two parties. This truth has been self-evident since the armistice agreements that established the cease-fire lines following the 1948-49 war between Israel and Arab states. Those agreements, Israel-Egypt of February 24, 1949, Israel-Lebanon of March 23, 1949, Israel-Jordan of April 3, 1949, and Israel-Syria of July 20, 1949, all stated that the cease-fire lines, established through the armistices, were to remain in force until “a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved.”
The cease-fire lines were made irrelevant as a result of the dynamics and consequences of the wars of 1967 and 1973. Following the wars the basis for resolution of the conflict became United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and UNSC Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.
Resolution 242 called for efforts to achieve a settlement based on a “just and lasting peace,” and on the right of states in the Middle East to live in peace, within secure and recognized boundaries. The essential problem was that the armistice lines of 1949 and the cease-fire lines of 1967 were not “secure and recognized boundaries.” According to the Resolution the armistice and cease- fire lines were to be replaced by boundaries which would be determined by negotiation, not by force or by unilateral action of any of the parties or states, nor were they to be imposed from the outside. Resolution 338 repeated the call for negotiations between the parties concerned, and restated the objective as establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East through negotiation.
What negotiation has taken place and what are the results? So far negotiation has achieved two peace treaties. The treaty between Israel and Egypt on March 26, 1979, encouraged further negotiation by inviting “the other Arab parties to the (Arab-Israeli) dispute to join the peace process with Israel.” The Israeli-Jordan treaty of October 26, 1994 reaffirmed the need to replace the temporary armistice and cease-fire lines with secure and recognized boundaries, and stated that disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of the treaty should be resolved only through negotiation.
Palestinian Obligations
However, Palestinian authorities have not yet agreed to a peace treaty with Israel nor to “secure and recognized boundaries” despite 30 years of arrangements and stated obligations. Though no resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has occurred, the international community throughout those 30 years has continued in different formats to make efforts to help resolve the conflict and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries. The preamble of the Camp David Accords, signed by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and witnessed by President Jimmy Carter, on September 17, 1978, which led to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of March 1979, provided a framework for negotiations to establish an autonomous self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians were urged to join in discussion of the autonomy and the election of such an authority. However, despite this invitation the Palestinians did not take the opportunity to join the discussion.
The next attempt by an international group to foster a peace process between Israel and Palestinians, as well as with other Arab countries, occurred at the Madrid Conference convened on October 30, 1991. The Conference, lasting three days, was hosted by Spain and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. Palestinians did participate in the Conference, at first indirectly and then as an ”advisory delegation.” The objective of the Madrid Conference was to foster negotiations on two tracks, bilateral and multilateral. It led to the Israel-Jordan peace treaty in 1994. It was also important because it was the first set of public bilateral discussions between Israel and its neighbors, except those with Egypt fifteen years earlier.
The discussion with the Palestinians consisted of two parts; negotiations on an interim self-government arrangement, and permanent status negotiations. Bilateral discussions on self-government were continued in rounds in Washington between December 1991 and January 1994. Multilateral negotiations beginning in January 1992 in Moscow, and later in other places, concentrated on a number of issues, water, environment, arms control, refugees, and economic development.
The Oslo Accords
The Madrid Conference may not in itself have been a dramatic success, but it did invigorate the search for a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Most importantly it led to the Oslo Accords of September 13, 1993. These Accords (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements), were the first public face- to- face bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The hope was that they would lead to further negotiations in which “final status issues” would be resolved.
The Accords, the outcome of secret negotiations between the parties that had taken place in Oslo in August 1993, were signed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO, and by President Bill Clinton, in Washington. They provided for the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PA) that would have responsibility for the administration of territory under its control. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were to withdraw from parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By the exchange of letters of mutual recognition between Rabin and Arafat, the former recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while Arafat acknowledged the right of Israel to exist and renounced the use of terrorism and other violence.
The Declaration of Principles laid out a five year timetable, an interim period during which permanent status negotiations would take place in stages. During this transitional period a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority and an elected Council would be established by Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The transitional period, not exceeding five years, was to lead to a permanent settlement of the conflict. It would start with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. The Palestinian Authority would have power over education, health, culture, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. Other subjects, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, security, and borders were to be negotiated at a later stage.
Following Oslo
The declared intention was that Oslo was to be followed by confidence building measures. These measures have taken a number of forms, the more important ones being the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of August 29, 1994, Oslo II of September 28, 1995, the Hebron Protocol of January 17, 1997, the Wye River Memorandum of October 23, 1998, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, the Camp David Summit of July 2000, and the Annapolis Conference of November 2007.
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement dealt with the preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities. Internal security for the two areas was divided between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel would be responsible for Israelis and the settlements in the areas; the Palestinian Authority would be responsible for public order in general and for many civil matters. Israel was to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho while retaining control and supervision over air space.
On September 28, 1995 the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, known more familiarly as Oslo II, between Israel and the PLO, provided for redeployment in the West Bank, including Palestinian self-rule in a number of cities, Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Tulkarm, and others. The West Bank was divided into 3 areas, A, B, and C. Area A was to be under full control of the PA; area B under joint Israeli and Palestinian control; and area C under Israeli control. The powers and responsibilities of each side in the respective areas were defined. The Palestinian Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel would be responsible for overall security.
The Hebron Protocol, signed in Jerusalem, by Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu, provided for withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of Hebron within 10 days, and then further withdrawal from the West Bank, apart from settlements and military locations, before mid 1998. This was followed a few days later, on January 21, 1997 by another agreement, the Temporary International Presence in the city of Hebron, which called for international monitoring and reporting on the situation in the city, but did not provide for military or police functions. What is significant in Israeli politics is that the Protocol was signed by the essentially Likud government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, a government had had been assumed by the international community to be unlikely to make concessions. The Hebron agreements were approved by the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, by a vote of 87-17, an outcome far different from the Knesset’s narrow approval of Oslo I by a majority of one, and of Oslo II by two votes. Israeli authorities had manifested their willingness to negotiate a solution. The city of Hebron was divided and the assumption was that each side would maintain peaceful order but Arafat did not crack down on terrorism against Israelis.
The Wye River Memorandum, at a meeting brokered and witnessed by President Bill Clinton at a center near Wye River, Maryland, was signed by Netanyahu and Arafat on October 23, 1998. It focused on implementing the September 1995 Interim Agreement. The two sides agreed to resume permanent status talks, to reach agreement in a step- by- step process by May 1999. The main provision was that Israel would engage in a staged withdrawal in the West Bank of 13% from area C and 14% from area B. In return the PLO agreed to act against outbreaks of terrorism and violence. What is most important for the analysis here is the statement in the Memorandum that “neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement.” Thus the principle of mutual agreement for change was maintained. Though the Knesset approved the Memorandum by a substantial majority, it remained unimplemented because of the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Al-Aqsa Intifada, in September 2000 that led to conflict causing over 6000 casualties.
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum and other Meetings
In spite of ongoing violence another meeting between the parties took place on September 4, 1999. Ehud Barak, leader of the Israeli Labor party who became prime minister in 1999, and Yasser Arafat at Sharm el-Sheikh signed a Memorandum, witnessed by President Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Its stated purpose was to implement Oslo II of 1995 and other agreements between the two sides. They agreed to resume permanent status negotiations to reach a permanent settlement. They agreed on a number of Israeli redeployments from areas C and B, the release of 350 Palestinian prisoners, and the opening of safe passages between the West Bank and Gaza. The principle of mutual agreement was reaffirmed. The Memorandum reiterated that neither side would initiate or take any step alone that would change the status of the West Bank or Gaza.
Another attempt to negotiate a “final status settlement” was made at the Camp David Summit in July 2000 in talks between Barak, Arafat, and Clinton. After two weeks the Summit ended without agreement. President Clinton later expressed his regret that Arafat had missed the opportunity to bring the Palestinian state into being. Instead a statement was issued suggesting that the principles to guide further negotiations must be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Again, the two sides avoided unilateral actions. They agreed that such actions would prejudice the outcome of negotiations, and reaffirmed the decision that their differences could be resolved only by good faith negotiations.
During the second Intifada a further attempt at settlement was made through talks conducted for a week in late January 2001 at Taba, in the Sinai Peninsula. This Summit, between Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israeli Foreign Minister in the government headed by Ehud Barak, and Saeb Erekat, chief negotiator of the PLO, focused on four main themes: refugees, security, Jerusalem, and secure and recognized borders. Though it was hoped that this Summit was help build trust between the two sides, the talks were discontinued on January 27, 2001, partly because of the reluctance to compromise on the part of the Palestinian delegation, and partly because of the preparations for the special Israeli election for prime minister which led to the defeat of Barak and to Ariel Sharon, leader of the Likud party, becoming prime minister of Israel, thus altering the political scene in Israel.
In the attempt to end the hostilities caused by the Al-Aqsa Intifada, another Summit meeting was convened at Sharm el- Sheikh in February 2005, attended by Sharon, President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah II, and Mahmoud Abbas, now President of the Palestinian Authority after the death of Arafat in November 2004. All called for the end of the hostilities. For our present purpose even more important was the fact that President Abbas continued to adhere to the principle of negotiation rather than to unilateral decisions. In his speech of February 8, 2005 he reiterated in the name of the PLO and the Palestine National Authority (the new name of the previous PA) “our adherence to the peace process points of reference, the resolutions of international legitimacy, the agreements signed between the PLO and the government of Israel, and the roadmap (of the International Quartet).”
Yet another peace conference was held at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland in November 2007. The United States hosted Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, the leader of Likud who became prime minister in 2006 after Sharon had suffered a stroke and was incapacitated, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at a meeting attended by President George W. Bush, and foreign representatives. The objective of the conference was to reach a peace settlement along the lines of President Bush’s roadmap for peace which would lead to a two state solution, a homeland for the Palestinian people just as Israel is the homeland for the Jewish people, and the resolution of all outstanding issues. For the first time both Israeli and Palestinian representatives acknowledged that peace would entail a two state solution.
Still involved in the search for Middle East peace is the Diplomatic Quartet on the Middle East, consisting of the U.S., the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia established in Madrid in 2002 by the Spanish Prime Minister to help, by a “roadmap” to move the peace process forward and to work for a two state solution. This means the creation of a Palestinian state that would recognize the state of Israel without prejudging grievances or claims, and would renounce violence as a means of achieving its goals. In essence this approach was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1850 of December 16, 2008, which was passed by 14-0, with the abstention of Libya. The Resolution noted that “lasting peace can only be based on an enduring commitment to mutual recognition, freedom from violence, incitement and terror, and a two state solution building on previous agreements and obligations.”
If Palestinian authorities introduce a unilateral declaration of independence and attempt to create a Palestinian state without recognizing the state of Israel it would be a breach of the obligations to which they have agreed, especially those of Oslo II. Furthermore, it would not in itself resolve any of the outstanding issues between the parties. It should be recognition of necessity, as well as adherence to moral obligations, for Palestinians and the international community to accept that direct negotiations with Israel are the only way to achieve a just and lasting peace and the establishment of secure and recognized borders.
Michael Curtis
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Rutgers University.