A Unilateral Palestinian State
In recent weeks Palestinian spokesmen have called for a unilateral declaration of a state of Palestine and for international recognition of it on pre-1967 lines, including East Jerusalem.
This is not the first time that such a statement has been made by Palestinian authorities. On November 15, 1988 Yasser Arafat at the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers proclaimed in a Declaration of Independence the “establishment of a state of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital, Jerusalem.” Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, (PLO), assumed the title “President of Palestine.” This Declaration did not specify any territorial borders of the state but it did refer to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947 for its legitimacy.
This was a surprising basis for a Palestinian claim. Resolution 181, the Partition Resolution, called for the establishment of two states, one Jewish, one Arab. The Zionist organization accepted the Resolution and on its basis established the state of Israel in May 1948. But the Arab parties not only did not accept it, but also strove to overturn it by attacking Israel on the day of its creation. The Arab League on April 12, 1948 declared its intention to liberate Palestine which would “be handed over to its owners to rule in the way they like.”
The 1988 unilateral Declaration described the entity to be established as the state of the Palestinians “wherever they may be.” Following this the UNGA adopted , by a vote of 104-2-36, Resolution 43/177 on December 15, 1988 which acknowledged the proclamation of the state of Palestine and authorized the PLO delegation , an observer body, henceforth to be called “Palestine,” though it did not say it was a state. About 90 nations did however recognize it. The Palestinians twice proclaimed they would form a state: in 1999 and in 2008 when Kosovo had unilaterally seceded from Serbia.
About any present Palestinian declaration two factors are pertinent. The first is the reality of whether Palestinians are ready and whether the criteria understood in international law as necessary to create a state have ben fulfilled. Several issues present problems. There is an absence of independent governmental control and sovereign authority with sole right of decision-making independent of foreign control. With the division of power between Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, stability is not assured, nor is the certainty of central control over a permanent population. Constitutionally, there is an uncertain, perhaps improper, situation since the term of the President Abbas expired in January 2009, and no one has been legitimately chosen to fill the position which he still occupies. So far a state of Palestine has no defined borders nor have crucial issues, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, boundaries, been agreed upon between the Palestinians and Israel. Relations between the more moderate Muslim Palestinians and the extreme Islamist forces in Hamas and in the Middle East remain tentative. The necessity of security guarantees for Israel has not yet been generally acknowledged by Palestinians.
The second factor is even more crucial. A unilateral action would be contrary to the legal understandings reached between Israel and the Palestinians. It is ironic that the Palestinian argument should be based on Resolution 181 which the Arabs rejected , and which goes counter to their familiar argument for a one state solution. More important, since 1949 all resolutions and agreements , from Resolutions 242 and 338 on, have rested on the assumption that resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by negotiation is the foundation of the peace process.
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, the Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and the PLO in Washington on September 13, 1993, agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian Authority for an interim period of not more than 5 years pending the outcome of permanent status negotiations based on Resolutions 242 and 338. The Interim Authority was to be given a limited number of powers previously exercised by the Israeli Military Government. It would have only the agreed upon powers, responsibilities, spheres, and authorities that were transferred to it. Israel would withdraw from parts of the West Bank and Gaza. In a mutual exchange, the PLO was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while the PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist.
The second Oslo Accord, the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement of 1995, set up the Palestinian Authority which was given certain powers while all others were reserved for Israel which withdrew from many of the West Bank towns. The Accord defined the powers and responsibilities of both sides. The 1995 Agreement specifically stated (Article 9) that the PA “will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations.” What is particularly important is that the Agreement also said (Article 31) that neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.” A unilateral action by the Palestinians would therefore mean the unraveling of the agreements made, and negate the validity of the compromises reached so far. It would signify an act of bad faith.